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This article seeks to analyse the effects of globalization on
the financial systems of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico,
which were the countries that received most of the foreign
investment in the region in the 1990s. This capital was
mostly made up of portfolio flows and investments in shares
traded on the local financial systems. The movement was
not homogeneous in all the countries, because of their dif-
ferent degrees of openness and differences in macroeco-
nomic policies. In the case of the portfolio investments, the
effects of the openness were concentrated in different seg-
ments and they therefore had different impacts on the finan-
cial systems in question. The recent experience of these
countries shows that there is still some room for national
economic policies to take action in the context of financial
globalization, even though their capacity to reduce the per-
verse effects of financial flows is limited. Foreign firms are
observed to be assuming growing importance in the coun-
tries studied, as a function of the degree of openness of the
local financial systems. This tendency is due to the liberal-
ization measures adopted in order to make possible capital-
ization of the banking systems and competition among
banks to find new sources of profits and strengthen their po-
sition in globalized markets. Although the predominance of
foreign companies has given a more solid capital base to the
national banking systems, it could have an adverse macro-
economic impact, especially in Mexico and Brazil, which
still maintain relatively independent monetary policies.
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I
Introduction
This article seeks to analyse the effects of globaliza-
tion on the financial systems of Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico, which were the countries that received
most of the foreign capital invested in Latin America
since the beginning of the 1990s. In the context of
the return of voluntary capital flows to the region,
there has been an intensification of foreign invest-
ment in the local financial markets. This consists
mostly of portfolio flows: that is to say, purchases of
movable assets by non-resident investors, and for-
eign direct investment (FDI), through the acquisition
of shares on local financial markets.
For the purposes of the present article, financial
globalization is defined as a process involving elimina-
tion of the segmentation of the different local financial
markets, interpenetration of the local monetary and fi-
nancial markets and their integration with world mar-
kets (Chesnais, 1994). The effects of this process on the
local financial systems are not the same in each case,
since they depend on the degree of financial openness
and the way capital flows are treated by the economies.
The greater the degree of financial openness –which is
related with the capacity of residents to acquire securi-
ties and assume liabilities in foreign currency and the
access of non-residents to the different segments of the
local financial markets (Akyüz, 1992)– and the more
receptive local policies are to the entry of external re-
sources, the greater will be the influence of these flows
on the respective financial systems.
The characteristics of capital flows from abroad
and their effects on the financial markets of Argen-
tina, Brazil and Mexico are studied in section II be-
low, the expansion of foreign direct investment in
local financial systems is dealt with in section III,




This section describes the general characteristics of
the recent process of financial openness in Argen-
tina, Brazil and Mexico, with special attention to the
regulatory framework which imposes discipline on
the one hand on the investments made by
non-residents and on the other on the monetary and
financial transactions in foreign currency (or denom-
inated in foreign currency) on local financial mar-
kets. The regulatory framework influences the
composition of foreign portfolio investments –in-
vestments in public or private shares or fixed-income
securities, foreign currency deposits in local banks,
or transactions in investment funds– and hence their
different effects on the various segments of national
financial markets.
1. The regulatory framework
The recent process of greater financial openness of
the Latin American economies fits into a more gen-
eral process of change in the international financial
market and forms an integral part of the stabilization
and reform programmes implemented as from the
second half of the 1980s. However, the degrees of fi-
nancial openness of the three countries studied here
differ considerably from each other. In Argentina,
the financial openness was complete. Mexico is in an
intermediate position, while in Brazil there are still
some restrictions on convertibility in the capital ac-
count, especially in respect of transactions in foreign
currency within the national territory.
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In the 1990s, the financial openness of the
Argentine economy was one of the main pillars of
the monetary stabilization programme applied by the
Menem administration. The Convertibility Plan pro-
vided for a fixed exchange rate regime with currency
convertibility: that is to say, a currency board regime
(Ferrari, 1998). In this context, the strategy adopted
in order to eliminate hyperinflation and reverse the
demonetization process was based on the designation
of the U.S. dollar as legal tender.1 This strategy in-
volved total freedom of capital movements between
the country and the exterior, as in this type of system
the monetary base is determined by the variation in
the international reserves, that is to say, the inflow of
liquid external resources.
Various institutional reforms made possible and
stimulated the development of the dollarized seg-
ment of the Argentine economy and its financial in-
tegration with the exterior. In 1989, it was decreed
that financial institutions must return deposits in the
same currency in which they were originally made,
and the Central Bank was denied access to those re-
sources. In 1991, total liberalization of the foreign
exchange market was achieved and the Converti-
bility Act was adopted (Fanelli and Machinea, 1997).
In addition to establishing a fixed exchange rate par-
ity and the convertibility of the peso with respect to
the dollar, this Act authorized the denomination of
contracts in any foreign currency. Total converti-
bility of the capital account was achieved after de-
regulating the capital market in 1991 –which
included the elimination of the tax on stock exchange
transactions and the authorization for companies and
banks to issue debentures and commercial paper ne-
gotiable in foreign currency– and adopting the Fiscal
Amnesty Act in 1992, which permitted the tax-free
repatriation of resources held abroad by Argentine
citizens (Blejer and Rozenwurcel, 1997). In 1992,
with the adoption of the new Articles of Incorpora-
tion of the Central Bank, the monetary reform pro-
cess was completed by establishing the independence
of the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic
(CBAR) and sharply restricting its capacity to provide
finance for the government and to act as lender of
last resort (Ferrari, 1998).
In Mexico, the recent financial openness process
included the liberalization of sales of securities by
non-residents and sales of public and monetary secu-
rities on the stock markets and fitted into the broader
context of the reform of the national financial system
begun in the late 1980s (Armella, 1993; Skiles,
1991).
The Stock Exchange Act passed in December
1989 expanded the possibilities of access to the secu-
rities market by foreign investors through the cre-
ation of a new form of investment, the “Fondo
Neutro” (“Neutral Fund”), which permitted these in-
vestors to acquire Series A shares.2 Through this
fund, foreign investors can acquire ordinary share
certificates (CPOs), which cover the yields on the
shares but not the equity rights. Up to that time, there
had only been two types of foreign investment in the
Mexican stock market: country funds –portfolios of
shares in the most representative Mexican companies
quoted on external financial markets– and freely
subscribable shares (Series B shares). These shares,
which were the traditional form of foreign invest-
ment in the Mexican stock market, continued to pre-
dominate even after the establishment of the Neutral
Fund (Caro Razú, 1994).
The central element in the liberalization of the
Mexican capital account in the 1990s was the open-
ing up of the public securities market. The prohibi-
tion of the purchase of such securities by
non-resident investors, which had been in force since
1980, was terminated in 1990 (Palomino, 1997 and
Griffith-Jones, 1996). Furthermore, in December
1991, as part of the deregulation of the monetary
market, transactions of Treasury Certificates (Cetes)
between financial intermediaries and foreign inves-
tors were authorized (Caro Razú, 1994). These cer-
tificates are the main security traded on that market.
The sale of private fixed-income securities was also
liberalized.
There were two other measures which helped to
establish closer links between foreign capital and the
domestic financial market. One was the establish-
ment of a simple and anonymous mechanism for re-
patriating resources invested abroad, subject to a flat
rate tax of 1%. The other was the abolition in No-
1 In Argentina, there was already progressive dollarization of
monetary and financial relations in the 1980s, representing a re-
sponse by the agents to chronic inflation and, in a second stage,
hyperinflation (Machinea, 1996).
2 In Mexico, there are several different types of shares: Series
A shares guarantee full control of the capital invested, while
those of the other series (Series B, C and L) only offer divi-
dends on the shares.
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vember 1991 of the dual exchange rate system which
had been in effect since 1982. As in Argentina, the
measure to provide an incentive for the repatriation
of capital was of fundamental importance, in view of
the magnitude of the capital flight which had taken
place in the 1980s (Gurría, 1997).
The process of liberalization of the Mexican
capital account was accompanied by the partial liber-
alization of transactions in foreign currency. From
1986 to 1991, deposits in foreign currency were only
permitted for companies located near the United
States border. In 1991, however, such deposits were
authorized for natural persons residing in those local-
ities and for Mexican legal persons in general. The
conditions of access of non-residents to such depos-
its were eased somewhat in 1993, but continued to be
restricted. Only official representatives of foreign
governments, international organizations and foreign
natural persons working for such organizations can
open foreign currency deposits in Mexico. Because
of these restrictions, such deposits account for only a
small amount of resources and are mainly used in
operations connected with foreign trade (Banxico,
1997 and 1998). As part of the domestic financial
liberalization process, however, authorization was
given for the issue of foreign currency-denominated
securities such as the Tesobonos (very short-term 1
to 3 month Treasury bonds indexed in dollars) and
bank certificates of deposit denominated in dollars
(Armella, 1993).
In Brazil, foreign portfolio investments in the
domestic financial market were significantly liberal-
ized with the financial openness process of the
1990s. However, this liberalization was less pro-
nounced than in Argentina and Mexico and affected
the different markets –the money, fixed-income and
stock markets– in differing ways. In the Brazilian
banking system, deposits and loans in foreign cur-
rency are still prohibited for both residents and
non-residents. One of the main conditions which
made the application of this measure possible was
the creation of indexed currency units in the 1980s
(financial operations with a liquidity of one day),
which, by replacing the national currency in its func-
tions as a value reserve and unit of account, were
able to prevent the dollarization of monetary and fi-
nancial relations which took place, for example, in
Argentina. Only a few transactions denominated in
foreign currency are permitted, such as public securi-
ties indexed on the exchange rate and loans with ex-
change rate correction. The relative weight of these
loans in the Brazilian financial system is not yet sig-
nificant, however (Prates, 1997).
Various different mechanisms were established
for foreign portfolio investment, differing both in the
type of instrument used –direct entry, or entry
through investment funds– and in the segment of the
foreign exchange market through which they are
made. Up to January 1998, the official exchange
market consisted of two segments: the commercial
exchange market, for trade and financial transactions
of strategic importance for the economy (trade bal-
ance, factor services, external debt, foreign direct in-
vestment, and the main forms of foreign portfolio
investment), and the floating exchange market, on
which all other operations, such as unilateral trans-
fers, tourism, etc., were carried out (Souza, 1993).
With regard to the commercial exchange market,
in May 1991 foreign institutional investors3 were
given direct and unrestricted access to the domestic
stock market. Access by non-resident natural persons
continues to be prohibited, however. The other in-
vestment alternatives are limited to specialized in-
vestment funds, which are subject to rules regarding
placement and taxation at the time when funds are
brought into the country and on capital gains, al-
though these restrictions do not apply to investments
in shares. Among these specialized funds,4 the most
important is the Foreign Capital Fixed-Income Fund,
whose resources must be invested in fixed-income
securities, with a minimum of 40% being invested in
public securities.
Foreign investors also have access to the Brazil-
ian financial market through non-resident accounts
on the floating exchange market. These accounts,
which are in local currency, are not subject to restric-
tions as regards the use to be made of the resources,
and are the main means of entry of “hot money”. As
these flows are attracted by the spread between do-
mestic and foreign interest rates, this form of invest-
ment was only profitable when this spread was
substantial, because apart from the greater exchange
risk involved –since they had to be effected on the
3 Brazilian legislation defines foreign institutional investors in
quite broad terms, since in addition to pension funds and insur-
ance companies they are considered to include foreign financial
establishments and foreign-based investment funds.
4 The other funds are the privatization funds (for foreign capi-
tal), the investment funds in emerging enterprises, and the real
estate investment funds.
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floating market– they were subject to higher rates of
tax. Other than having to pay a higher rate of the tax
on financial transactions, these operations received
the same fiscal treatment as in the case of residents
and were even subject to the provisional withholding
tax on financial movements.
Through these mechanisms, the prevailing regu-
latory framework sought to select the capital flows
effected on the commercial exchange market by es-
tablishing specific forms of application for vari-
able-income and fixed-income investments. At the
same time, an instrument was established for the
floating exchange market with the aim of absorbing
the most highly speculative external resources.5
2. The impact of foreign portfolio investments
on Latin American financial markets
The impact of foreign portfolio investments on Latin
American financial markets varies according to the
different degrees of financial openness, the specific
characteristics of each financial system, and the dif-
ferent options for the macroeconomic management
of these flows. A fundamental aspect is that of the
forms these investments take in domestic financial
markets which have been liberalized. Portfolio in-
vestments involve considerable financial risks for the
peripheral countries, especially in terms of possible
exchange or banking crises. These risks depend both
on the term of the investments and on their charac-
teristics: fixed-income or equity investments and
short, medium or long-term flows (Basle Committee
on Banking Supervision, 1995).
In Argentina, the Central Bank does not main-
tain detailed records of portfolio flows to the domes-
tic financial market, but in general portfolio
investments correspond to the unspecified capital
movements registered in the “other movements” item
of the balance of payments (Fanelli and Machinea,
1997).
The demand for financial assets and the degree
of monetization of the Argentine economy began to
recover in 1991, after the adoption of the Converti-
bility Plan, when capital flows changed direction
(table 1). Both residents and non-residents used de-
posits in dollars to bring resources into the country.
In this way, they protected themselves against the
risk of devaluation and took advantage of the pre-
vailing high domestic interest rates. The remainder
of the capital flows went to the local stock exchanges
(Fanelli and Machinea, 1997).
The inflow of capital played a fundamental role
in the remonetization process and the recovery of the
level of financial intermediation The stabilization
process and the adoption of currency convertibility
were not reflected in any substantial recovery in the
demand for national currency, however: on the con-
trary, they increased the degree of dollarization, as
foreign-currency deposits came to predominate
(Machinea, 1996).
The expansion of the dollarized segment was not
accompanied by a corresponding increase in the term
of deposits, which continued to be concentrated on a
30-day term. Because of the larger amount of for-
eign-currency finance, loans in dollars predominated.
The relative share of such loans amounted to 58% of
TABLE 1
Argentina: Monetary aggregates of the economy, 1990-1997
(Percentages)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
M1 as % of GDP 2.1 4.3 5.2 6.0 6.1 6.7 7.7 8.6
M2 as % of GDP 3.8 7.4 9.5 11.8 11.9 11.1 13.0 11.1
M2a as % of GDP 5.0 11.1 14.4 19.0 20.0 19.5 23.1 …
Deposits (US$/total) 28.0 45.0 45.0 47.0 51.0 54.0 53.9 53.8
Time deposits (US$/total) 30.0 54.0 54.0 58.0 65.3 71.9 72.3 …
Source: Data of the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, in Fanelli and Machinea (1997), Carta Económica in Meyer (1997a) and
Carta Económica in Ferrari (1998).
a Includes deposits in dollars.
5 In February 2000 the Brazilian Government decided to do
away with the differential treatment for variable-income and
fixed-income investments and authorized portfolio investments
by physical persons in the Brazilian stock market. These
changes, which came into force on 31 March 2000, increased
the financial openness of the Brazilian economy and thus re-
duced the differences in terms of openness with the other coun-
tries analysed here.
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the total in 1994, compared with 40% in 1991
(Ferrari, 1998). These resources went mainly to pro-
duction activities for the domestic market and fi-
nance for the purchase of consumer durables (Blejer
and Rozenwurcel, 1997). Thus, the vulnerability of
the Argentine financial system to the reversal of
capital flows, which was inherent in the converti-
bility system, was further heightened by the liquidity
of deposits in dollars (and in pesos) and the concen-
tration of loans in the non-tradeable sectors, which
increased the exposure of the banks’ portfolios to
exchange rate devaluation. The absence of a lender
of last resort further accentuated this vulnerability,
which became very evident with the Mexican crisis
in December 1994. The outflow of capital due to the
“tequila effect” was reflected in a serious banking
crisis in the first half of 1995 and a profound eco-
nomic recession.
It may be noted that the macroeconomic man-
agement applied under the domestic convertibility
system presupposes a significant degree of recep-
tiveness to capital flows. Under this system, the in-
flow of capital does not affect exchange and
monetary policies –and is not therefore reflected in
an increase in the public debt– but it is reflected in
an increase in dollar deposits in the banks, which
stimulates domestic demand and economic activity.
In Mexico, foreign portfolio investments repre-
sented over 60% of the capital flows received by the
country between 1990 and 1994. These flows went
in particular to the purchase of shares and Mexican
government paper (table 2). Deposits in the banking
system, such as time deposits and bank certificates
denominated in foreign currency, were not very sig-
nificant. The segment of the Mexican financial mar-
ket most affected by the financial openness process
was the public securities market. In the case of the
stock market, the impact of foreign portfolio invest-
ments was less marked because, up to 1995, most of
the stocks were acquired through the use of Ameri-
can Depositary Receipts (ADRs). There was thus a
transfer of liquidity to the United States securities
exchanges, especially the New York Stock Ex-
change. In Mexico and Argentina, the flight from
the local securities exchanges was heightened by the
use of ADR programmes in the privatization process.
The aim of these programmes was to reduce the pos-
sibility of saturation of the local market because of
the large volume of the stocks traded compared with
the size of those exchanges (ECLAC, 1995).
The large volume of foreign investments in
public securities, until the outbreak of the Mexican
crisis at the end of 1994, was the main special fea-
ture of Mexico in comparison with the other coun-
tries studied. Between 1990 and 1994, these
operations accounted for 55% of total foreign port-
folio investments. Between 1991 and 1993,
non-residents absorbed the greater part of new issues
of public securities, especially short-term ones, and
their share of total Mexican public debt rose from
8% at the end of 1990 to 57% at the end of 1993
(Griffith-Jones, 1996).
In 1994 there was a significant change in the
composition of the public debt in the hands of for-
TABLE 2
Mexico: Foreign portfolio investments in the Mexican financial market, 1991-1997
(Millions of dollars)
Stocks Government securities
ADR markets Mexican stock Cetes Tesobones Other
Year market a Total Total
Total % Total % Total % Total % Total %
amount total amount total amount total amount total amount total
1991 13.7 73.9 4.9 26.1 18.6 3.0 54.0 0.3 4.7 2.2 41.3 5.5
1992 21.2 73.8 7.5 26.2 28.7 9.2 64.3 0.2 1.4 4.8 34.3 14.2
1993 34.0 62.2 20.6 37.8 54.6 15.4 70.2 1.3 5.9 5.2 23.9 21.9
1994 21.2 61.6 13.2 38.4 34.4 2.5 12.3 17.4 85.0 0.6 2.7 20.5
1995 15.2 62.1 9.3 37.9 24.5 2.8 82.0 0.2 5.6 0.4 12.4 3.4
1996 15.1 48.8 15.9 51.2 31.0 3.0 89.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 10.8 3.4
1997 23.1 47.2 25.7 52.5 48.8 3.0 90.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 90.7 3.3
Source: BANXICO, 1998.
a Includes freely tradeable shares, “Neutral Fund” and country funds.
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eign investors. Treasury Certificates (Cetes), which
are denominated in pesos, systematically took the
place of Tesobonos, which were very short-term se-
curities indexed in dollars (table 2). After February
of that year, because of the rise in United States in-
terest rates and the exchange risk associated with the
upward trend of the current account deficit, the pre-
mium demanded by foreign investors for maintaining
their holdings of Cetes increased considerably. In or-
der to avoid an excessive increase in the cost of
rolling over the public debt and an outflow of capital,
the government began to offer Tesobonos to
non-resident investors. As a result, by mid-1994
those investors held 80% of the total amount of such
bonds outside the banking system (Goldestein and
Turner, 1996).
The experience of Mexico shows the negative
effects that can result from opening up the public
debt securities market to foreign investors, especially
when those securities are short-term and denomi-
nated in foreign currency. The Tesobonos market
was one of the main focal points of the 1994 ex-
change crisis.6 The volume of those securities held
by non-residents, which exceeded the size of the in-
ternational reserves, increased the vulnerability of
the balance of payments and the public accounts to a
possible reorientation of capital flows. In view of the
growing mistrust about the Mexican government’s
capacity to meet its liabilities in respect of those se-
curities, foreign investors proceeded to sell off their
holdings. As the reserves were only small compared
with the magnitude of the capital flight, the Central
Bank was unable to contain the exchange crisis and
had to opt for a floating exchange rate. Furthermore,
the public sector was faced with the need to refi-
nance a large volume of short-term debts in dollars,
whose local-currency value had risen because of the
currency devaluation.
It may be noted that much of the increase in the
public debt was associated with the monetary policy
of partial sterilization of the inflow of external re-
sources. By avoiding a drop in domestic interest rates,
this policy encouraged capital inflows, but as the pub-
lic debt was acquired by non-residents the policy of
sterilization did not do anything to reduce the vulner-
ability of the economy and the financial system to
capital flows. On the contrary, this strategy height-
ened the external fragility of the Mexican economy.
Apart from the sterilization policy, the more flexible
exchange policy adopted (including the introduction
of exchange-rate bands in 1991) and the fiscal sur-
pluses achieved helped to partly offset the monetary
impact of the external resources (Gurría, 1997).
In Brazil, almost all the foreign portfolio inves-
tors operated on the São Paulo stock exchange
(Bovespa), the most important of the country. The
amounts of external resources procured through in-
vestment funds were not significant. Only the For-
eign Capital Fixed-Income Fund (FRFCE) attracted a
fairly substantial amount of resources at the times of
biggest interest rate spreads, mainly in public debt
securities indexed on the exchange rate (similar to
the Mexican Tesobonos). Investments made through
non-resident accounts also went mainly to these se-
curities, although the total volume in the hands of
non-residents continues to be small.
As a result, the effects of the financial openness
were concentrated in the secondary securities mar-
ket. Unlike what happened in Mexico, up to 1997 the
number of ADR programmes of Brazilian companies
was small both in absolute terms and in comparison
with the other Latin American countries, and the
market value of the shares traded on the ADR market
was equivalent to only 6.5% of the capital value of
Bovespa’s operations in December 1997 (Freitas and
Prates, 1999). This is explained by the size of the
Brazilian market, which has a higher level of capital-
ization and hence greater liquidity than the Mexican
market. Moreover, in Brazil the privatization process
has not so far involved the issue of ADRs. The share
of foreign investors in the total amount traded on
Bovespa has increased significantly in recent years,
from 6.5% in 1991 to 29.4% in 1995. Along with the
growth of this share there has also been a continual
increase in the volumes traded and the capital value
of the market (table 3).7
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6 The other focal point was the banking system, because the
banks held large amounts of short-term liabilities in foreign cur-
rency and part of them were guaranteed by Tesobonos. With re-
gard to the Mexican banking crisis, see Griffith-Jones (1996)
and Folkerts-Landau, Mathieson and Schinasi (1997).
7 It may be noted that the increase of over 100% between 1996
and 1997 in the volume traded was due to the privatization of
Vale do Rio Doce and several State-owned electric power com-
panies. These movements were also stimulated by the progress
in the privatization of the Telebras and Eletrobras systems.
In contrast, however, the financial openness
did not help to reduce the degree of concentration
of the secondary market or to boost the primary se-
curities market. Purchases by foreign investors
were concentrated in the stock of State enterprises
in the process of privatization (especially Telebras
-Brazilian Telecommunications), because of the
prospect of an increase in their value once they had
been privatized. Because of this, the market value
and liquidity of shares in private companies con-
tinued to be low, thus discouraging demand by in-
vestors and new stock issues. The low volume of
primary issues meant that the shares of those com-
panies accounted for a smaller relative share of the
secondary market, thus increasing the concentra-
tion of transactions in more liquid securities
(Prates, 1999).
Although portfolio investments in shares are
less volatile than fixed-income investments, be-
cause of the greater risk of capital loss, these in-
vestments also involve financial risks for the
peripheral countries. Because of the large volume of
capital flows compared with the size of the stock
markets, the rearrangement of their portfolios by
foreign investors has a strong impact on share prices
(Akyüz, 1992). The effects of these movements on
the Brazilian stock market were clearly visible dur-
ing the Mexican and Asian crises. On those two oc-
casions –in the first quarter of 1996 and the last
quarter of 1997– stock prices fell sharply because of
the sale of their holdings by foreign investors to
cover their losses on other emerging markets or to
increase their provisions for covering possible with-
drawals by their clients.
III
The growth of foreign direct investments
in national financial systems
During the 1990s the financial markets of the Latin
American countries also attracted foreign direct in-
vestment in the form of equity participation in local
financial intermediation companies or the installation
of new branches or subsidiaries totally controlled by
foreign financial institutions. On the one hand, this
tendency was fostered by the new competitive strate-
gies of financial institutions in the industrialized
countries, marked by the elimination of barriers be-
tween the activities of banks and non-bank financial
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TABLE 3
Brazil: Participation by foreign investors in the São Paulo
stock exchange, 1991-1997
Foreign investment a Total amount traded b Capital turnover of the Main stock traded cYear
market b
1991 6.0 28.4 43 615.1 41.3
1993 16.0 96.4 99 430.1 50.2
1994 21.4 303.6 189 058.2 40.1
1995 29.4 233.3 147 560.0 49.8
1996 28.6 356.0 216 927.0 61.2
1997 25.9 786.7 255 409.0 55.86
Source: BOVESPA, Revista Mensual, various issues.
a Foreign participation as a percentage of the total volume traded.
b Millions of dollars.
c As a percentage of the total volume traded.
institutions and the concentration and centraliza-
tion of capital in national markets through merg-
ers and acquisitions, while the process was also
facilitated by the abolition or easing of restrictions
in a number of countries and the establishment of
subsidiaries or branches of foreign institutions in lo-
cal markets, the participation of non-residents in
the equity of local institutions, and the activities
of foreign financial intermediaries in local mar-
kets. These measures to liberalize the treatment
accorded to foreign financial institutions were
adopted both by the industrialized and by the periph-
eral countries (Freitas, 1999).
The increase in competition in the local markets
of the central countries prompted banks and other fi-
nancial intermediaries to seek new areas for making
profits. In their efforts to strengthen their global po-
sitions, financial institutions opted for the geograph-
ical diversification of their activities through the
establishment of branches or subsidiaries in foreign
countries. The main difference between this process
and the internationalization of the 1960s and 1970s is
that the strategies of support for transnational enter-
prises and the supply of external finance which pre-
vailed at that time gave way to a strategy of
diversification of activities in the local markets of the
host countries. This process calls for denser networks
and greater integration of the foreign institutions into
the local banking system.
Apart from the need to diversify outside their
own saturated local markets, the recent entry of
important financial groups into the region has also
been stimulated by the stability of the Latin Amer-
ican economies, the prospect of numerous profit-
able business opportunities, and the existence in
most cases of relatively weaker local competitors.
The Spanish-speaking countries were the first tar-
gets for direct investments by these groups, but in
the second half of the 1980s it was Brazil’s turn.
Indeed, the Brazilian market came to be the most
highly prized in the region, as it offered the possi-
bility of big profits for the foreign banks that set
up operations there.
In this section, we will analyse the recent expan-
sion of banking institutions in Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico. We will begin by looking at the changes
made in the legal and regulatory treatment given to
foreign capital, after which we will analyse the ex-
pansion strategies adopted by foreign banks in those
three countries and the results of their activities.
1. Changes in the legal treatment given to
foreign capital
The three countries analysed here have different
features as regards the legal treatment given to for-
eign institutions. Whereas the regulatory environ-
ment in Argentina was more favourable for those
institutions, in Mexico and Brazil the prevailing
conditions for the establishment of branches by
non-resident institutions and for participation in the
equity of local institutions were more restrictive.
This accounts for the different degrees of openness
and liberalization.
In Argentina, the openness of the local financial
system was promoted as part of the 1977 financial
reforms, when all restrictions on the entry of new in-
stitutions and the expansion of bank networks were
abolished, both for local and foreign institutions
(Feldman and Sommer, 1984). In practice, the Ar-
gentine legislation adopted the principle of according
foreign banks the same treatment as local ones, so
that they were subject to the same rules, or rules that
were no less favourable. This legislation also ex-
panded the range of permissible activities for all
banks.
The non-discriminatory treatment given to for-
eign capital made possible the recent denationaliza-
tion of the Argentine financial system. As from
1997, foreign institutions –which occupied only
modest positions in the local market in the period of
high inflation– embarked on a series of total or par-
tial purchases of local banks. At present, with the ex-
ception of the two big public banks –the Banco de
la Nación and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos
Aires– and one private bank (Banco Galicia y Bue-
nos Aires), all the main Argentine banks are con-
trolled by non-residents.
The three biggest private banks controlled by
non-residents have continually increased their mar-
ket shares, with the introduction of new products
(Folkerts-Landau, Mathieson and Schinasi, 1997,
p. 161). The concentration of the Argentine banking
system is also reflected in the total number of institu-
tions, which went down from 205 in December 1994
to 138 in December 1997.
In Mexico, the entry of foreign banks was pro-
hibited until the 1990s. These institutions were only
allowed to be present as representation offices, with
a very limited field of activity, since they could not
carry out any financial intermediation operations
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whatever. Furthermore, from the nationalization of
the banking system in 1981 up to its privatization in
the early 1990s, the establishment of new institutions
was prohibited even for residents.
In July 1990, with the entry into force of a new
law on credit institutions, the conditions of access of
foreign financial institutions to the local financial
system began to be eased. Under this law, the Minis-
try of Finance and Public Credit, which is responsi-
ble for the regulation of financial institutions, was
empowered to authorize the establishment of agen-
cies of foreign banks in the country. These branches
could only operate with non-residents, however
(Ferreira and others, 1998). At the same time, minor-
ity foreign participation in the equity of brokerage
houses was also authorized.
In April 1994, under the terms of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, rules were adopted
on the establishment of Mexican branches of foreign
financial institutions, authorizing the direct opening
of branches of United States and Canadian banks and
stockbroking firms and the formation of ten foreign
financial groups, six of which included a bank. In
addition, thirteen branches of foreign insurance com-
panies were authorized to operate in the country
(Palomino, 1997).
A further easing of the restrictions on foreign
banks in Mexico took place in the context of the seri-
ous crisis in the banking system in 1994. With the
aim of shoring up the capital of institutions damaged
by the crisis, the legislation on the structure of the
equity of banks and holding companies of financial
groups was reformulated in February 1995 to permit
the participation of foreign legal persons (Banxico,
1996). Non-residents were authorized to acquire se-
ries B and L shares up to an individual limit of 20%
of the equity of Mexican institutions. This limit
could be increased, however, if a branch of a foreign
bank gained control of a local bank by purchasing all
the series A shares. In order to prevent the biggest
banks from being acquired by foreign institutions,
the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit laid down
that no individual foreign bank could own more than
6% of the total assets of the domestic banking sys-
tem (Meyer, 1997b).
It should be noted that the Mexican Government
authorized foreign institutions to participate in the
privatization of the banking system. Their participa-
tion was limited to 30% of the total capital, however,
with an individual ceiling of 5% for each investor. At
the end of 1998 the Mexican Congress did away with
this restriction, thus making possible majority for-
eign control of national commercial banks, including
the three largest: Banamex, Bancomer and Serfin
(Taylor, 1999).
In Brazil, except for the period from 1946 to
1964, when there was complete freedom of access of
foreign institutions to the local financial system,
there have always been restrictive rules, either on the
entry of foreign banks or on the conditions under
which they can operate on the local market. From
the 1965 financial reforms up to 1995, foreign di-
rect investment in the banking system and the
range of activities foreign banks were allowed to
engage in depended on the principle of reciprocity.
Under this approach, the Brazilian Government
only permitted the entry of banks from countries
which likewise permitted the access of Brazilian
banks to their financial systems. Representation
offices could be freely established throughout this
period, however.
After the 1988 Constitution came into force,
the access of foreign capital to the financial system
was virtually prohibited, since it depended on the
formulation by Congress of a regulatory frame-
work for which the corresponding regulations have
still not been adopted. However, article 52 of the
Transitory Constitutional Provisions did leave
open the possibility of the entry of foreign institu-
tions into the Brazilian market through authoriza-
tions resulting from international agreements
involving the principle of reciprocity, as a counter-
part for the establishment of branches of Brazilian
banks abroad, or in circumstances considered by
the government to involve the “national interest”.
Applications were to be examined on a
case-by-case basis, subject to the final approval of
the President of the Republic.
In August 1995, taking advantage of this pre-
rogative, the government declared, in Exposition
of Motives No. 311, that it was in the country’s in-
terest to permit the entry or expansion of foreign
participation in the national financial system. This
decision was taken in the light of the growing fra-
gility of the national financial system, which had
been affected by an abrupt contraction of liquidity
due to the restrictive economic measures adopted
to cope with the impact of the Mexican crisis. The
opening up of the financial system also satisfied
the desires of many foreign financial institutions
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and represented a partial concession to the de-
mands expressed in many international forums,
such as the World Trade Organization, MERCOSUR
and the Free Trade Area of the Americas.
The opening up of the capital market, the pri-
vatization and industrial restructuring processes,
and the possible business opportunities associated
with financing the renewal of the economic infra-
structure were the main attractions for foreign di-
rect investment in the Brazilian financial system.
Various financial institutions showed great interest
in operating in the country in order to take advan-
tage of the big possibilities for business and profits
that existed, especially in the investment banking
sector. The growth potential of retail trade and bank
accounts was also a big attraction for the foreign
banks, both those that were only now entering the
market and those that were already established in the
country. Whereas there is only one bank for every
4,500 persons in Brazil, in Germany there is one for
every 2,000, and in Spain, one for every 1,100 per-
sons (The Economist, 1998, p. 61).
The announcement of the government’s decision
to authorize foreign participation in the equity of lo-
cal private institutions and in the privatization of the
public banks, as well as to allow the establishment of
new foreign subsidiaries, stimulated the interest of
foreign institutions in entering the local financial
market. As from August 1995, there was a consider-
able increase in the contacts between local banks and
foreign institutions interested in associating with
them, acquiring a majority share of their equity or
even buying them outright.
This movement took on such proportions that
the Central Bank began to demand that institutions
requesting authorization to enter the market or ex-
pand their activities should pay a kind of “toll” as a
contribution to the public resources used to put the
financial system on a sound footing, except when the
foreign institutions were acquiring banks that were
insolvent or in serious financial difficulties (Freitas,
1999).
These measures to ease the conditions for the
entry or functioning of foreign banks have been
highly recommended to developing country gov-
ernments by the representatives of multilateral
agencies such as the International Monetary Fund
or the World Bank. In the view of these official
agencies, greater participation by foreign capital in
local banking systems will help to strengthen the
ability of the latter to weather macroeconomic cri-
ses, as possible difficulties of the local subsidiaries
of foreign banks will not automatically cause them
to go bankrupt. In addition, it is expected that,
through the introduction of “greater competition”,
foreign financial capital will solve the main short-
comings of local financial markets, such as their
high spreads and costs compared with international
levels, the high concentration of risks, and the exis-
tence of restricted markets.
2. The expansion strategies of foreign banks
In order to diversify their activities abroad, banks
adopt various expansion strategies in keeping with
the regulatory and legal framework of the host coun-
try. For new arrivals, the choice lies between open-
ing a totally controlled local branch or subsidiary or
acquiring equity participation in a local institution.
Foreign banks which are already present in the coun-
try usually prefer either gradual growth through the
establishment of a network of branches to expand
their business base, or an aggressive policy of pur-
chasing market shares by absorbing their competi-
tors. The form of expansion adopted is closely
related to the range of institutions existing in the dif-
ferent markets. This typology can be used to analyse
the recent expansion of foreign banks’ activities in
Latin America.
As may be seen from table 4, in Mexico foreign
banks took advantage of the more flexible access
conditions applied after the 1995 financial crisis to
acquire shares in the equity of the local institutions
placed under the control of the local supervisory
body, the National Banking and Securities Commis-
sion, and/or financed by FOBAPROA, the bank deposit
guarantee fund. In Brazil, some foreign institutions
also opted to acquire equity control of local banks,
while others preferred to set up branches or subsid-
iaries.
With regard to the expansion of banks already
present in the region, an examination of recent trends
shows that in Argentina the preferred method used
by foreign institutions to strengthen their positions in
the local market was the absorption or purchase of
majority shares in local banks (table 5). In Brazil, the
oldest-established banks in the country, such as
Lloyds Bank and the ABN-Amro Bank, adopted dif-
ferent expansion strategies. In Mexico, the local sub-
sidiary of Citibank –the only survivor of the
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nationalization process of the 1980s– acquired the
Confia bank in August 1997. This bank had been in-
tervened by the Central Bank because of its irregular
activities abroad (The Banker, 1997b, p. 46).
In the three countries analysed, the aggressive
strategies adopted by Spanish banks, and also by
new rivals such as the Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC), forced the foreign
banks which had already been established in the re-
gion for a long time to take defensive measures.
Some of them opted to expand their networks of
branches, as BankBoston did in Brazil and Argen-
tina, while others –such as Bankers Trust in Argen-
tina and Lloyds Bank, Chase Manhattan and
ABN-Amro in Brazil– decided to buy local banks or
shares in their equity.
The result of this recent internationalization pro-
cess suggests that foreign institutions are likely to
take on growing importance in the local financial
markets of the countries analysed. The rate of expan-
sion of the foreign banking presence varies consider-
ably from one country to another, however. Between
December 1994 and December 1998, foreign partici-
pation in the local financial systems increased more
rapidly in Mexico than in Brazil and Argentina
(table 6). In Mexico, this expansion was very sub-
stantial: at the end of 1998, foreign banks possessed
40% of the market compared with only 1.2% in
1994. The advance of foreign banks was also consid-
erable in Brazil, especially in 1997 and 1998. In Ar-
gentina, the latest figures available are for 1997, but
it may be assumed that foreign participation has in-
creased in 1998 because the process of acquisition of
local banks has continued.
The different rates of internationalization re-
flect the heterogeneity of the regulatory frame-
works existing in each country. As it is the most
open, the Argentine banking system is most likely
to register a further increase in foreign participa-
tion. In Mexico, some legal restrictions which
limit the expansion possibilities of financial insti-
tutions are still in force, despite the new financial
law approved by Congress at the end of 1998.
Brazil is in an intermediate position, as the legal
loophole opened by the government may be closed
if Congress finally decides to adopt financial sys-
tem legislation which restores the limitations pre-
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TABLE 4
Brazil and Mexico: Main participants in the banking
internationalization process, 1995-1998
Host country Institution Country of origin Manner of entry
Brazil Hong Kong and Shanghai United Kingdom Acquisition of the assets of the Banco Bamerindus
Banking Corporation (HSBC) (bankrupt)
Groupe Crédit Suisse Switzerland Acquisition of the Banco Garantía
Nations Bank United States Acquisition of 51% of the equity of the Banco Liberal
United Bank of Switzerland Switzerland Establishment of a wholly-owned subsidiary
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV) Spain Acquisition of the Banco Excel-Económico
(bankrupt)
Rabobank Netherlands Establishment of a branch
Mexico Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV) Spain Acquisition of 70% of the Probusa group
Bank of Nova Scotia Canada Acquisition of 45% of the equity of the Banco Inverlat
Bank of Montreal Canada Acquisition of 16% of Bancomer
A.G. Alemania Germany Acquisition of control of the Banco Banoro and
Bancrecer
Banco Santander Spain Establishment of subsidiaries and acquisition of
51% of the equity of the Banco Mexicano
Hong Kong and Shanghai United Kingdom Acquisition of 20% of the equity of the
Banking Corporation (HSBC) Serfin group
Banco Central Spain Acquisition of 10% of the equity of the Prima
Hispano International group
Source: Conger (1998); Freitas (1999); Warner (1995 and 1998); Del Villar and others (1997); Taylor (1997a and b); The
Banker (1997a ); Cypher (1996).
viously in force under the pressure of influential
local banking interests.
Differences in the institutional aspects of fi-
nances in these three countries also undoubtedly help
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TABLE 5
Latin America: Examples of the recent expansion of foreign banks
Host country Institution Country of origin Manner of expansion
Argentina Hong Kong and Shanghai United Kingdom Acquisition of 100% of the Banco Roberts
Banking Corporation (HSBC)
BankBoston United States Expansion of network of branches
Banco Santander Spain Acquisition of 51% of the equity of the Banco
Río de la Plata
Bank of Nova Scotia Canada Increase from 25% to 100% of participation in the
equity of the Banco Quilmes
Grupo Socimer Switzerland Acquisition of 30% of the equity of the
Banco Patricios
Bankers Trust United States Acquisition of 51% of the Banco Liniers
Sudamericano
Crédit Agricole France Acquisition of 1/3 of the equity of the Banco Bisel
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV) Spain Merger of the Banco Francés del Río de la Plata,
controlled by BBV, with the Banco de Crédito
Argentino
Brazil Citibank United States Expansion of network of branches
BankBoston United States Expansion of network of branches
Banco Santander Spain Acquisition of 51% of the equity of the Banco
Geral do Comércio and of the Banco Noroeste
Lloyds Bank United Kingdom Acquisition of the Banco Multiplic and its finance
company
ABN-Amro Bank Netherlands Acquisition of 40% of the equity of the Banco Real
Chase Manhattan United States Acquisition of the Banco Patrimônio
Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) France Acquisition of the Banco FonteCindam
Mexico Citibank United States Acquisition of the Banco Confia
Source: Conger (1998); Freitas (1999); Warner (1995 and 1998);  Taylor  (1997a and b); The Banker (1997a and b).
TABLE 6
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: Evolution
of foreign participation in the local
financial systems
Foreign-owned assets, as a percentage of




Argentina 21.7 45.0 ...
Brazil 11.0 21.1 22.5
Mexico 1.2 19.9 40.0
Source: Goldenstein and Turner (1996); Palomino (1997);
Folkerts-Landau, Mathieson and Schinasi (1997, p. 165);
The Economist (1997); KPMG Peat Marwick (1998), and
Conger (1999).
to explain the greater or lesser success that foreign
banks have had in gaining positions in the local mar-
kets. Thus, for example, Argentine and Mexican
banks are smaller than those of Brazil. Of the ten
biggest Latin American banks in December 1997, six
were Brazilian, three were Argentine, and only one
was Mexican (table 7). In addition to their extensive
networks of branches, Brazilian banks also use so-
phisticated technologies for electronic transfers of
funds and resource management. These technologies,
which were developed in a period of high inflation,
will help them to keep their clients and avoid the fi-
nancial dis-intermediation suffered by Argentine and
Mexican banks, while they also place them (espe-
cially in the case of the big banks) in a position to
compete with the foreign banks operating in the
country.
Compared with the other Latin American banks,
the Brazilian banks also benefit from the fact that the
national banking system has not gone through any pro-
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TABLE 7
Situation of the ten largest Argentine, Brazilian and
Mexican banks in December 1997
Capital Ranking
Institution Country Ownership (millions of
dollars) Latin America a World b
Banco do Brasil Brazil Public 5 562 1 63
Bradesco Brazil Private 5 481 2 65
Itaú Brazil Private 3 893 3 99
Unibanco Brazil Private 2 373 4 145
Banespa Brazil Public 2 350 5 147
Nación Argentina Argentina Public 2 002 6 166
Banamex Mexico Private 1 790 7 181
Bancomer Mexico Private 1 659 8 196
Banco Real Brazil Private 1 581 9 200
Provincia de Buenos Aires Argentina Public 1 223 10 238
Compared with:
Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC) United Kingdom Private 27 392 - 1
Citicorp United States Private 22 211 - 4
ABN-Amro Netherlands Private 15 864 - 8
Nations Bank United States Private 13 599 - 13
Santander Spain Private 7 952 - 40
Bank of Nova Scotia Canada Private 6 820 - 49
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain Private 6 800 - 50
Source: The Banker (1998).
a The 25 largest banks, according to their capital, excluding wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign banks.
b The 1,000 largest banks, according to their capital.
found, generalized crises in recent decades. Further-
more, the local banking institutions are not viewed with
mistrust by the public: on the contrary, public banks at-
tract more clients than the private institutions when
the financial situation becomes more delicate.
The most vulnerable aspect of the Brazilian
banks is their relatively small volume of capital
compared with the foreign banks. This is
also true of the Argentine and Mexican banks.
Indeed, the HSBC alone has more capital than
the ten biggest Latin American banks put to-
gether (table 7). In the countries where such ac-
tions are permitted, the local banks are
extremely vulnerable to the threat of a hostile
takeover by foreign institutions.
IV
Conclusions
As we have tried to show, the impact of foreign in-
vestments (portfolio and direct) on the Latin Ameri-
can financial markets varies according to the
different degrees of financial openness, the specific
institutional characteristics of each national financial
system, and the different macroeconomic manage-
ment options with regard to external capital flows.
In the three countries studied here, the profile of
portfolio investments in the local financial markets
was determined by the different financial openness
policies, influenced (among other factors) by the
monetary stabilization strategies adopted, which also
determined the different degrees of freedom of
macroeconomic management with regard to capital
flows. In Argentina, the adoption of a stabilization
plan based on a currency board system meant the to-
tal financial openness of the economy. In Mexico
and Brazil, the anti-inflation policies followed did
not call for the complete liberalization of the capital
account and the adoption of currency convertibility.
Furthermore, the exchange-rate and monetary system
in force after stabilization (exchange-rate bands) al-
lowed some leeway for the macroeconomic manage-
ment of capital flows through expansion of the
exchange-rate fluctuation band in order to discourage
the entry of short-term flows and the sterilization of
capital inflows through the issue of public securities.
The effects of the opening-up of local financial
markets were concentrated in different segments: in
the money market in Argentina, in the public securi-
ties market in Mexico, and in the secondary stock
market in Brazil. For this reason, the impacts of for-
eign direct investment on the national financial sys-
tems and, ultimately, on the economy as a whole,
differed both in terms of the moments of abundance
and the changes in direction of those flows. The up-
sets caused by a capital flight due to the sudden with-
drawal of non-residents’ bank deposits (which are
generally used to finance domestic credit operations)
are, potentially, much more harmful than those asso-
ciated with the massive sale of shares by foreign in-
vestors, because in Latin America there is little
integration between the credit and stock markets (ei-
ther through cross-participation or through the use of
such documents as loan collateral). Consequently,
the repercussions of financial openness on the pe-
ripheral economies also depend on the structural
characteristics of the national financial systems.
In spite of the common features of the economic
policy strategies of the three countries analysed –sta-
bilization plans with an exchange-rate anchor, finan-
cial and trade openness, privatization, etc.– the
experience of Argentina, Mexico and Brazil in the
1990s shows that there is still some leeway for na-
tional policies in the context of the present financial
globalization. Those policies can reduce the financial
risks associated with foreign portfolio investment, as
those risks are directly related with the nature of
capital flows and their maturities.
With regard to the local financial systems, there
is a trend towards the growing importance of foreign
institutions in the financial markets of the three
countries in question. This trend is due, above all, to
the liberalization measures taken by the governments
to bring capital into their weakened bank finance
systems. This greater foreign participation is also due
to the competitive strategies of the banks themselves,
which are trying to find new sources of profits and to
strengthen their positions in increasingly globalized
markets.
Contrary to the claims of the multilateral organi-
zations, which advocate opening up the financial sys-
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tems of the developing countries to foreign
institutions, there is no guarantee that the entry of
new competitors will be reflected in lower credit
rates and costs. The entry of new institutions and the
increase in the foreign presence in the countries stud-
ied is basically motivated by the desire to make big
profits. In this respect, even though they may have
competitive advantages over the local banks it is
hard to imagine the foreign institutions forgoing high
incomes by reducing their rates and margins. Where
this does happen, it is rather a question of short-term
marketing strategies than of a lasting policy. More-
over, competition in terms of prices is only one of
the various competitive strategies of a banking insti-
tution. The possible positive impact of greater for-
eign participation on the cost of banking services and
the financial conditions of the local economies, as
well as on the quality of the banking services offered
to the public, remains to be seen. It is an unknown
quantity, and only time will tell.
There is, however, one aspect that is worth
mentioning as a beneficial consequence of greater
participation by foreign banks, namely, the in-
creased financial solidity of the national banking
systems. There can be no doubt that stronger insti-
tutions have a greater capacity to withstand macro-
economic shocks, thus reducing the possibility of
systemic crises.
Nevertheless, the possibility of migration of re-
sources to foreign banks in the event of capital flight,
as a safety measure by the public in the face of the
possible insolvency of a major domestic private
bank, would undoubtedly have harmful effects on
macroeconomic management in countries like Brazil
and Mexico, which still enjoy relative monetary sov-
ereignty because they have not adopted the currency
board system. In a context marked by the predomi-
nance of foreign institutions, the monetary authori-
ties would have the greatest difficulty in handling the
liquidity conditions of the system. The Brazilian au-
thorities faced a situation of this type in 1995, when
the rise in domestic interest rates in response to the
adverse reactions to the Mexican crisis profoundly
affected the local banking system. With the rise in
interest rates and the increase in the number of bad
debts, the banks became more selective, thus compli-
cating the refinancing of non-financial debtors and of
the banking institutions most dependent on
inter-bank transactions. On that occasion, the prefer-
ence of the private banks (both domestic and foreign)
for liquidity cancelled out the Central Bank’s efforts
to reactivate the inter-bank market. Had it not been
for the aid of the main public banks, which acted as
lenders of last resort for the banks which were hav-
ing difficulties, the financial fragility of the banking
system could have got worse and set off a general-
ized crisis. This experience suggests that it is impor-
tant for developing countries to have a mixed
banking system in which well-managed public banks
coexist with domestic and foreign private banks and
aid in achieving the objectives of government policy.
(Original: Portuguese)
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